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RACE, JUVENILE JUSTICE, AND MENTAL
HEALTH: NEW DIMENSIONS IN
MEASURING PERVASIVE BIAS
W. JOHN THOMAS, DOROTHY E. STUBBE," GERALDINE
PEARSON*"
I. INTRODUCTION
Delinquent Children, are those, who through Ignorance, Vice,
Folly, Sport Carelessness, Thoughtlessness and in a hundred other ways,
violate City Ordinances, Laws, statutes or the Rights of Others, for which
there must be some method of Correction.
Defective Children, are those who are physically or mentally defi-
dent, thereby becoming a charge upon the State, and therefore need
the Protective Care of The State or Community in their misfortune;
whether these physical or mental Defects are due to Heredity or other-
wise, the best method of handling them is through the juvenile Court, or
one similar to it, after which they may be sent to the proper Institution,
where the best care for the individual case may be given.'
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Health Law and
Policy, Quinnipiac College School of Law;, Instructor, Yale School of Medicine, De-
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during presentations of earlier drafts.
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'Wimm MACDONALm, A STORY OFJUVETNI COURTS FROM TEIR INCEPTION TO TBE
PRESENT DAY, wrrH COMMENTS UPON THE EXTENSION OF THE PROBATION SYSTEM AND A
HISTORYOFTHEJUVENaE COuRTMOVEmENTS 6 (1912).
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Almost from the moment of its inception in 1899,2 the juve-
nile court has witnessed criticism of its handling of youths suf-
fering from mental illness. Dr. William MacDonald made the
point in a 1912 critique of the Connecticut juvenile justice sys-
tem: "We should have a law creating a Juvenile Psychopathic In-
stitute for Juvenile Offenders, Mental Defectives, and etc. Many
of these Juvenile Offenders need the services of a good physi-
cian more than they do those of the jailor."3
As soon as states had begun to address Dr. MacDonald's
concern,4 criticism turned to the disposition ofjuvenile criminal
offenders between the criminal justice and mental health sys-
tems.5 The research has usually taken one of two forms. Most
research has compared samples from the juvenile justice and
mental health systems and concluded that race is "the most
striking factor distinguishing the two groups."6 Other research-
ers have compared the juvenile criminal justice and mental
health population with the racial distribution of the general
population and found an "absence of racial bias in admission"
to the mental health facilities.7
Our study injects two new dimensions into the existing body
of knowledge. First, it is the first study to compare only court-
referred adolescents in the mental health system with those in
the criminal justice system. This methodology offers a more
2A 'HONy A. PLArT, THE CHL SAVERS 9 (1969) (identifying the Illinois juvenile
court established in 1899 as the first "official"juvenile court in the nation).
3MACDoNALD, supra note 1, at 27.
4See infra Part H.B.
' See American Psychiatric Association, APA Official Actions: The Psychiatrist and the
Juvenile Court System. 147 AM.J. PsYCHIATRY 1584, 1584 (1990) (chronicling the psychi-
atric profession's concern with the juvenile court from its inception).
' Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Race Bias in the Diagnosis and Disposition of Violent Ado-
lescents, 137 AM.J. PsYcHIATR' 1211, 1211 (1980) [hereinafter Lewis et al., Violent Ado-
lescents]. See also Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Some Evidence of Race Bias in the Diagnosis
and Treatment of the Juvenile Offender, 49 AM.J. ORTHoPSYCHIATRY 53 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Lewis et al.,Juvenile Offenders]; Floyd Westendorp et al., Variables Which Differentiate
Placement of Adolescents Into Juvenile Justice Or Mental Health Systems, 81 ADOLESCENCE 23
(1986). For a more detailed discussion of existing research, see infra Part HA.7 Stuart L. Kaplan &Joain Busner, A Note on Racial Bias in the admission of children
and adolescents to State Mental Health Facilities versus Correctional Facilities in New York, 149
AM.J. PsYCHIATRY 768, 771(1992). For a more detailed discussion of existing research
see infra notes 124-70 and accompanying text.
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precise measurement than that offered by all of the previous re-
search which compared the full correctional school population
with the ful psychiatric hospital population. Second, the study
is also the first to compare clinically-referred patients with court-
referred patients in the juvenile mental health system.
Our findings indicate that the racial profiles of the court-
referred and clinically-referred juveniles in the mental health
system are statistically indistinguishable. A comparison with
1990 Connecticut census data reveals that racial minorities are
over-represented in both the state-operated facilities of the
mental health and the juvenile justice systems." The popula-
tions did, however, exhibit different psychiatric profiles. The
clinically-referred were more likely to exhibit psychotic disor-
ders while the court-referred were more likely to exhibit overt
conduct disorders.9
Part II of this article places our study's findings in historical
and jurisprudential context by outlining the history of juvenile
court, chronicling the court's involvement in the placement of
adolescents in the criminal justice and mental health systems,
and summarizing the courts and processes that figured in the
study results. Part III provides an exposition of the existing
body of knowledge on the subject. Part IV outlines our study's
methods and findings and concludes with a detailed compari-
son of the psychiatric profiles of the clinically-referred and
court-referred patients in the mental health system. Part V
closes the article with a discussion of the implications of our
findings for the future of the juvenile justice and mental health
systems.
a 1990 U.S. Ces (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/
lookup>.
9 See infra Part IV.A.2.b.iv for definitions of these diagnoses. See infra Parts IV.B.2.f
for a discussion of these findings.
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II. THE HISTORICAL ANDJURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
A. THE ESTABLISHMIENT OF THEJUVENILE COURT
Although there are some antecedents, ° scholars generally
acknowledge that the Illinois legislature created the first juve-
nile court in 1899.11 Before that year, American courts followed
the English custom of subjecting juveniles over the age of four-
teen to the same laws and tribunals as adults. Children under
the age of seven were deemed incapable of forming the intent
necessary for criminal conviction.' s Those between the ages of
seven and fourteen benefited from a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity to form the requisite intent.4
Juveniles, convicted were subject to the same penalties as
adults, including incarceration in the same facilities.15 The re-
sult, one observer unhappily reported, was the incarceration of
youths guilty of what might have been termed juvenile mischief
alongside hardened, adult convicts:
In Illinois in 1897, and especially in Chicago, the condition
of these classes ofJuveniles was deplorable, there being in Cook
County alone, over 2,000 boys in prison, for offenses such as
petty thefts, disorderly conduct, killing birds, fighting, truancy,
stealing rides on cars, and similar offenses; These boys were sent
to Jail or Prison to work out fines from One to One Hundred
16Dollars and Fifty cents per day...
'0 The legislatures of Massachusetts and New York enacted, in 1874 and 1892, re-
spectively, legislation separating child trials from adult trials. PLATr, supra note 2, at
9. In 1868 for girls and 1879 for boys, the Connecticut legislature enacted legislation
in 1868 enabling police courts to commit girls to an "institution of correction" for
adolescents who were "in danger of falling into vicious habits or crime." MACDONALD,
supra note 1, at 8.
" PLATr, supra note 2, at 9-10. For two detailed accounts of the history of the juve-
nile court, see generally Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REv. 691 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]; Barry C. Feld, TheJuve-
nile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment and the Differenc It Makes,
68 B.U. L Ruv. 821 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, The Princip of Offense].
12 David R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Indi-
vidualizedJustic 79 HARV. L REv. 775 (1966).
13 Id.
14 id.
s PiATr, supra note 2, at 9-10.
16 Id. at 8.
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Those bent on reform, and who became known as the
originators of the Progressive Movement, argued that all con-
victed of crimes and especially juveniles should receive "indi-
vidualization of treatment and a progressive form of prison
discipline."17 That individualized focus led to the creation of a
variety of criminal justice reforms, including probation, inde-
terminate sentences, and parole. s Its cornerstone, where juve-
niles were concerned, was the creation of the juvenile court.9
The juvenile court was to be part of a system that removed
minors from the adult criminal justice system and created pro-
grams to address the needs of "delinquent, dependent, and ne-
glected children."20 In large measure, this was to be
accomplished through substitution of rehabilitation for pun-
ishment:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has
this boy or girl committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how
has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his in-
terest and in the interest of the state to save him from his
downward career.2 '
The change in ideology had an immediate, dramatic im-
pact:
The results, to give it briefly was [sic] as follows, after but a year
and a half of operations under the new law, The District Attor-
ney reported that instead of between two and three hundred
cases of boys being brought before the Grand Jury, there were
only ten or twelve such cases; and the Jailor reported that in-
stead of Six Hundred boys at the Jail under Sixteen, there were
only about twenty...2
Apparently impressed with these results and the aims of the
Progressive Movement, all but two states had established juve-
'
7 Id. at 46 (quoting MAX GRUNHUT, PENALRFoRM 89 (1948)).
Feld, The rinciple of Offense, supra note 11, at 823.
See gerallyJulian W. Mack, TheJuvenile Court, 23 HARv. L REv. 104 (1909).
20 PIATr, supra note 2, at 10.
21 Barrett et al., supra note 12, at 775 (quoting Mack, supra note 19, at 119-20).
" MAcDONALD, supra note 1, at 8.
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nile courts by 1925 and all states did so by 1945.2 Guided by a
positivist view of crime, 4 the reformers viewed delinquency as
determined by the juvenile's environment and, instead of at-
tempting to punish immoral behavior, crafted a system ofjustice
that emphasized inquiry into the accused's background rather
than the facts of the specific crime alleged." As a result, the ju-
risdiction of the juvenile courts came to encompass "status" of-
fenses such as truancy, smoking, and other immoral activity that
the state viewed as worrisome, but which did not constitute
crimes. 6 Concomitantly, the disposition did not need to be re-
lated to the severity of the offense, but could be fashioned to
serve the juvenile's best interests.'
Although championed by its creators as "one of the greatest
advances in child welfare that has ever occurred,"2s the juvenile
court came to be criticized by two groups. The first-the "legal
moralists"--viewed the expansion of jurisdiction over children
as an illicit attempt to increase the state's control over them.29
Moreover, these critics contended, jurisdiction had been ex-
panded to control not only specific acts, but specific classes of
children.
It was not by accident that the behavior selected for penaliz-
ing by the child savers-drinking, begging, roaming the streets,
frequenting dance-halls and movies, fighting, sexuality, staying
out late at night, and incorrigibility-was primarily attributable
to the children of lower-class migrant and immigrant families."
ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNs & TImSTLES: JUVENIE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1825-1940, at 132 (1978). For a recent summary of the status of the juvenile
court, see Thomas F. Geraghty & Steven A. Drizin, Symposium on the Future of the
Juvenile Court, Foreword-The Debate Over the Future of Juvenile Courts: Can We Reach
Consensus?, 88J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1997).
24 For a summary of the tenets of Positivism, see DAVID MATA, DEUNQUENCY AND
Dazwr 5 (1964).
2Feld, The Principle of Offens4 supra note 11, at 825.
"See id. at 825 n.12.
2Id. at 825.
"PLATr, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting Charles L. Chute, The Juvenile Court in Retro-





The second group-the "Constitutiona]ists-focused on
the process the courts employed rather than the acts and chil-
dren that they addressed.3' Because the courts addressed the
"best interests" of the juveniles who came before them, they did
not employ procedural safeguards such as the rights to an im-
partial hearing, to counsel, and to the privilege against self in-
crimination. As a result, contended these critics, the courts
employed arbitrary procedures that unconstitutionally deprived
juveniles of liberty.3 2 This fact, asserted one critic in 1914, was
not "changed by refusing to call it punishment or because the
good of the child is stated to be the object."3
In its 1967 decision in In re Gault, the Supreme Court sided
with the Constitutionalists and, in doing so, ushered in a juve-
nile court system that conformed more closely to the views of
the legal moralists. The Court first observed that the discretion
that courts employed in the Progressive tradition of serving the
juvenile's best interests was "a poor substitute for principle and
procedure."3 That principle and procedure, the Court held,
entailed attaching constitutional safeguards such as the rights to
counsel, to an impartial hearing, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and the privilege against self incrimination to the
hearing at which a juvenile is adjudicated a delinquent.3 In es-
sence, the Court shifted the inquiry of the proceeding from
serving the juvenile's "best interests" to proof of the alleged
crime.
In the years following Gault, the Court ruled that other ele-
ments of the adult criminal defendant's battery of constitutional
rights, including the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt7 and the prohibition of double jeopardy,3 attached to
3' Id. at 152-53.
' For a summary of other Constitutionalist literature, see PLATr, supra note 2, at
158 n.73.
" M at 158 (quoting Edward Lindsay, The Juvenile Court Movement from a Lawyer's
Standpoint Lfl ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. Sci. 145 (1914)). For a summary of
other Constitutionalist literature, see PLATT, supra note 2, at 158 n.73.




7 In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
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the juvenile criminal process. In 1971, however, the Court
stopped short of implementing the "Constitutionalists" vision of
parity between adult and juvenile criminal proceedings. In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'9 the Court held that the right to a jury
trial does not apply to juvenile proceedings.' The Court em-
phasized that the treatment mission of the juvenile court neces-
sitated more informal procedures than sanctioned by the
punitive mission of the adult courts.4
If Gault signaled a shift from the Progressive "treatment"
concept of juvenile justice back to the "punitive" concept origi-
nally administered by American courts, McKeiver symbolized a
revitalization of the Progressive belief that juvenile criminal
courts should serve a purpose very different from that served by
adult criminal courts. That revitalization, however, was fleeting.
During the past decade, state legislatures have begun to em-
brace a more punitive vision of criminal justice, enacting legisla-
tion making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal
court.4 2 Today, almost all states have statutes which authorize
the use of adult courts for juveniles who commit serious
crimes.4 Some statutes have reduced the age for adult trial to
thirteen,44 a year younger than the common law presumptive
age of adult capacity applied by American courts before the
Progressive revolution of 1988.45
" Breed v.Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
39 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
" Id. at 550 (plurality opinion).
41 Id.
4 See generally, PATRICIATORBET, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS
AND VIOLENTJuvENILE CRIME xii (1996). For other, recent commentaries on the state
of the nation's juvenile courts, see e.g., Louise D. Palmer, In court, youths losing their
innocence: Demands for stricter punishment send more juveniles to adultjails, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 24, 1999, at A10 ("In the past six years alone, 40 states have passed laws making it
easier to prosecute children in adult criminal courts."); Vincent Schiraldi, Prosecutorial
zeal vs. America's kids, CHRISIAN Sa. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 1999, at 9; Fox Butterfield,
With Juvenile Courts in Chaos, Some Propose Scrapping Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1997, at
Al.
" David C. Anderson, When Should Kids Go to Jai4 Tim AMERICAN PROSPECT, May-
June 1998, at 72.
"See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Although the juvenile court has come nearly full-circle in
less than a century, it has been unable to shake any of its critics.
Those who apparently pine for the days before the court's crea-
tion still criticize the court as insufficiently punitive.4 Some
echo the Constitutionalists and criticize the juvenile court as
"procedurally bankrupt."47  Others appear to echo the legal
moralists by attacking the institution as an illicit assertion of
control over juveniles.,8 Still others argue that the only way the
court can succeed is to broaden its mission: "Juvenile judges
need to exercise their authority to bring parents into the court-
room and make them take an active role in their kids' problems.
J ..judges need to bring schoolteachers, school counselors,
ministers and community activists into the juvenile justice proc-
ess and make them get involved." 49 Most recently, the debate
has centered on whether to abolish the court and to try juve-
niles and adults in one, unified court.0
In sum, the issues that led to the court's creation hardly
seem resolved.
B. JUVENILE COURTS AND ISSUES OF MENTAL HEALTH
Despite the recent attempts to make juvenile courts resem-
ble adult criminal courts, they continue to serve quite a differ-
ent purpose. In addition to trying and sentencing "delinquents"
who commit crimes, the juvenile courts in all states also deter-
mine the fates of "status offenders" who come before the court
charged with running away from home, truancy, and failing to
yield to the control of their parents.
"See, e.g., Alfred S. Regenery, GettingAway with Murder Why theJuvenile Justice System
Needs an Overhaul POL'YREV., Fall 1985, at 65.
Mark Curriden, Hard Times for Bad Kids, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1995, at 67.
SeeJanet A. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing Legal Order: The
Case forAbolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. Rev 1083, 1084 (stating the "perceptions
of youth have changed in the late twentieth century,... undermin[ing] the ideologi-
cal legitimacy of [maintaining] a separate juvenile court.").
"Curriden, supra note 47, at 69.
For a summary of the arguments, see generally Marygold S. Melli, JuvenileJustice
Reform in Context, 1996 Wise. L. REv. 375.
" See WALTER WADLINGTON ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CHLDREN IN THE LEGAL
Sysmm 602-48 (1983).
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Given the broad range of reasons for which a juvenile may
appear before the juvenile court, it is not surprising that sub-
stantial numbers display evidence of some mental health prob-
lem 2  Thus, whether "handling" those with mental health
problems through the juvenile court is the best method for ad-
dressing their needs,5 many states have increasingly found it a
necessary one.
States, communities, and the public have not always recog-
nized this need. Colonial society did not systematically address
the plight of the deviant or dependent. 4 And, although nine-
teenth century American society began to look to institutions to
control and change the behavior of criminals,5 it did not seek to
address the mental health needs of troublesome youth'
6
That view did not change with the creation of the juvenile
court. Indeed, in 1923, the U.S. Bureau of the Census declared
serious mental health problems non-existent among minors:
Mental disease occurs principally in adult life. Psychopathic disor-
ders appear in children, but as a rule these are not serious enough to re-
quire commitment to a hospital for mental disease.... It will be noted
that only 0.2 per cent of the total patients were under 15 years of age and
only 1.5 per cent were under 20 years.57
Thus, up until the end of World War II, few troubled youth
were classified as in need of mental health services.- Rather, ju-
veniles coming before the juvenile courts were invariably la-
beled either delinquent or dependent. 9  The delinquent-
those adjudicated to have committed crimes-were placed in
juvenile correctional institutions.w The dependent-those other-
-2 See PAUL LERMAN, DFINSTITUTIONA TION AD THE WELFAIRE STATE 107-08
(1982).
-1 See MACDONALD, supra note 1, at 6.
SeeDAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, T-E DISCovEYOFTHE ASLUM 4 (1971).
See id. at 57-60.
56 See LERMAN, supra note 52, at 109-10 ("Mental health... was only beginning to
develop as a new resource in the 1920s.").
Id at 110 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PATIENTS IN HOSPrrALS FOR
MENTALDISORDERS 26 (1923)).
SeeiL at 133.
59 See id. at 109.
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nile correctional institutions.r° The dependent-those other-
wise in need of the state's care-were placed in the child welfare
system.61  Dependent and neglected children were originally
housed in institutions for delinquents. At the turn of the cen-
tury, however, private organizations began to form foster care
centers and similar institutions to care for the dependent and
neglected.s Only with the passage of the 1935 Social Security
Act did government begin to take the primary role in caring for
the dependent and neglected.0
Meanwhile, a third system-the mental health system-be-
gan to take shape. The presumption about the age of the onset
of "insanity" reflected in that 1923 census reportO eventually
gave way, and after World War II reference ofjuveniles to inpa-
tient psychiatric facilities began to increase.6 The rate of insti-
tutionalization for people under twenty years of age increased
from twenty-two per 100,000 in 1950 to forty-six in 1970.6 And,
the rate of institutionalization increased consistently from 1946
to 1975 only for those under the age of fifteen.6 7
In his' classic Deinstitutionalization and the Welfare State, Paul
Lerman concluded that the increased representation of juve-
niles in the mental health system appears to have resulted from
changes in admission practices of mental health facilities rather
than the emergence of traditionally recognized mental illnesses
in a younger population. Reporting on 1975 data, he divided
diagnoses between "classical symptoms"-organic brain disease,
depression, schizophrenia, other psychoses, and neuroses-and
"general/behavioral disorders"-personality disorders, child-




62 See id. at 110-11, 147-48.
3Seeid. at148.
" See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
6See LERMAN, supra note 52, at 133.
'See id. at 134 (citing M. Kramer, Psychiatric Services and the Changing Institutional
Scene, 1950-1985, in NAnONAL INSTITuTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ANALYriCAL AND SPECIAL
STUDYREPORTS, Series B, No. 12 (1977)).
67 See id. at 134-35.
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drug disorders.s Seventy-four percent of all ages were admitted
to general hospital psychiatric units for classic mental illnesses,
but only 42% of those under the age of eighteen were admitted
with those diagnoses.0 On the other hand, 57.2% of those un-
der age eighteen were admitted with diagnoses of gen-
eral/behavioral disorders, while 26% of all ages were admitted
with those diagnoses.70
The data were even more striking for state and county men-
tal health facilities. Twenty-seven percent of those under age
eighteen and 53.1% of all ages were admitted with classic diag-
noses.7' Nearly 72% of those under age eighteen and 46.9% of
all ages were admitted with general/behavioral diagnoses.72
Thus, Lerman concluded, "The state hospitals, in particular, are
probably admitting many youth who may be engaging in deviant
behavior, but who are not mentally ill in a classical sense."73
Others have reached similar conclusions. Robert Miller and
Emmet Kenney, for example, conducted a pioneering three-
year study of the hospitalization of juveniles in state psychiatric
facilities.74 Finding that nearly 71% had been admitted for "so-
cially deviant behavior,"7 they concluded by asking whether "the
psychiatric hospital is becoming more sociological than medi-
cal" in its psychiatric approach.76
In 1988, Lois Weithorn chronicled and critiqued this in-
creasing admission ofjuveniles to mental health facilities.7 She
reported that admission of minors to mental health facilities in-
creased more than eight-fold from the 1920s to the 1970s.
From 1971 to 1980, the rate continued to increase, with a shift
6' See id. at 135 tbl. 8-6.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 134-35
7' See id. at 135 tbl. 8-6.
72 See id.
7 Id. at 135.
' See Robert Miller & Emmet Kenney, Adolescent Delinquency and the Myth of Hospital
Treatment 12 CRIME & DEINQ. 38 (1966).
75 Id. at 43.
76 Id. at 47.
' See Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of
SkyrocketingAdmission Rates, 40 STAN. L REv. 773 _(1988).
73 See id. at 783.
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from hospitalization in public facilities to private facilities.
From 1980 to 1984, private mental health facility admissions of
juveniles increased by more than four and one-half times.7
Weithorn criticized what she characterized as "rather vague
and overly broad criteria"w that resulted in the admission of two-
thirds of juveniles with diagnoses of "conduct disorder, person-
ality or childhood disorder, or transitional disorder."8' And she
concluded that the increasing admission rates were the product
of the admission of "'troublesome' youth who do not suffer
from severe mental disorders."82
Others do not concur in Professor Weithom's critique. The
American Psychiatric Association (APA), for example, has con-
tended that, "[w]hile the pendulum often swings from rejection
of the rehabilitative and treatment model in corrections to rec-
ognition of the need for mental health clinical input, the im-
portance of psychiatric involvement remains constant." 8
Indeed, and contrary to Weithorn's conclusion, the APA con-
cludes that the problem is that too few troublesome youth are
placed in mental health facilities.8 Moreover, the APA adds,
whatever direction that pendulum may swing in the future, "the
importance of psychiatric involvement remains constant." '
In all events, rates of admission ofjuveniles to mental health
facilities have climbed in recent decades. Moreover, juveniles
are now admitted to mental health facilities with diagnoses not
recognized as mental illnesses when the Census Department
concluded in 1923 that mental health problems do not occur in
juveniles.86
7 See id.
"See id. at 785.
"Id. at 789.
See id. at 774.
"American Psychiatric Association, supra note 5, at 1584.
Id. at 1584-85. The APA noted that 40% to 70% of incarcerated delinquents
have some psychiatric "handicapping condition." Id. at 1584. "The scope of the
problem is underscored by the fact that in 1987, 25,024 children and adolescents
were incarcerated in state-operated juvenile institutions but fewer than half that
number were patients in state mental hospitals." Id. at 1584-85 (citations omitted).
"Id. at 1584.
"See supra text accompanying note 57.
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C. CONNECTICUT COURTS AND PROCESSES
In 1912, William MacDonald reviewed the treatment of ju-
venile criminal offenders by Connecticut's adult courts and
concluded that creating a separate juvenile criminal court was
the only method available to address successfully children's
problems that he asserted were "becoming more and more
complex.",7 Apparently heeding Mr. MacDonald's call, in 1921
the Connecticut legislature enacted legislation creating the
state's firstjuvenile courts.m
Established in each of the then-existing 169 towns in Con-
necticut, the system suffered from a lack of uniformity and a
successful challenge to its constitutionality.90 In 1935, the legis-
lature set out to restructure the system, beginning by establish-
ing two experimental, county-wide juvenile courts.91 When the
experiment apparently proved successful, the legislature dis-
mantled the existing city-by-city system and substituted courts
with territorial jurisdiction based on county boundaries.92
From these early days, the Connecticut juvenile courts dif-
fered in some respects from the courts of other states. While
the courts of most states share the territorial boundaries of the
states' adult courts,93 beginning in 1941, Connecticut established
a tradition of maintaining jurisdictional boundaries peculiar to
juvenile courts. Initially, the legislature established three dis-
tricts, with each comprised of two or three counties. s Judges
traveled a circuit and held court in various cities within their
MACDONALD, supra note 1, at 26.
See 1935 Conn. Pub. Acts § 697. For a summary of the history of the Connecticut
juvenile courts, see generally David J. Frauenhofer et al., Practice and Procedure of the
Juvenile Court forthe State of Connecticut 41 CONN. B.J. 201 (1967).
"9 Only four cities employed full-time staff in their courts. Id. at 209. (citing TEM
CONNECTICUTJUVENILE COURT, ITS STRUcrURE, PHILOSOPHY, PROCEDURE 2 (1959)).
' See Cinque v. Boyd, 121 A. 678 (Conn. 1923) (holding that the courts' ability to
order the detention of a child during the pendency of an appeal violated the State's
constitution).
"' See 1935 Conn. Pub. Acts § 697(c).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-54 (1958).
"' For a summary of the territorial jurisdiction of the juvenile courts in the 50
states, see SANFORDJ. FOX,JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 10-11 (1984).
9Id.
[Vol. 89
districts.95 In 1976, effective in 1978, the legislature delegated
the function of designating judicial districts to the superior
court.9 At the time of our study, the courts, through an agency
entitled the Family Division Administration, had established
thirteen juvenile judicial districts, comprised of entire counties,
portions of counties, and districts that overlapped portions of
two or more counties.9
At the time of our study,98 the subject matter of the courts
included proceedings concerning allegedly uncared-for,9 ne-
glected,'00 dependent,'0 1 and delinquent'0 2  children103  and
youth.14 The juvenile courts were also empowered to hear cases
concerning "families with service needs'"-families of a child
Frauenhofer et al., supra note 88, at 210-211.
96 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-142 (West 1995).
97 The Family Division Administration announces any changes in the juvenile judi-
cial districts in its biannual report to the superior court. Telephone Interview with
Frank Driscoll, Deputy Director of Connecticut Family Division Administration (July
10, 1995). The superior court publishes the districts in booklet form. See, e.g., STATE
OF CoNNECrcuTJUDIa.AL DImcroRY 25 (Sept. 1994). The October 80, 1992 listing
by the Family Division Administration, which lists thirteen districts, numbered one
through fifteen, with numbers two, three, and eight omitted and one district not
numbered, reveals the apparently informal process by which the districts are deline-
ated.
" In 1995 the Connecticut General Assembly enacted legislation that changed in
minor fashion some of the rules that follow. "An Act Concerning Juvenile Justice,"
1995 Conn. Acts 225 (Reg. Sess.). The changes included the creation of an "Office of
Alternative Sanctions" "charged with the duty of developing constructive programs
for the prevention and reduction of delinquency and crime among juvenile offend-
ers." Id. § 6.
That legislation made more substantial changes to the transfer rules discussed in-
fra, notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
" An uncared-for child is one "who is homeless or whose home cannot provide the
specialized care which his physical, emotional or mental condition requires." CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-120 (1995).
'® A neglected child is one who "(A) has been abandoned or (B) is being denied
proper care and attention.., or (C) is being permitted to live under conditions, cir-
cumstances or associations injurious to his well-being, or (D) has been abused." Id.
'0' A dependent child is one "whose home is a suitable one for him, save for the fi-
nancial inability of his parents, parent, guardian or other person maintaining such
home, to provide the specialized care his condition requires." Id.
'02 A delinquent child is one who has "violated any federal or state law or municipal
or local ordinance ... "or "who has violated any order of the superior court." Id.
'3 A child is "any person under sixteen years of age." Id.
" A youth is "any person sixteen to eighteen years of age." Id.
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who "has without just cause run away from home," "is beyond
the control of his parents" or guardian, "has engaged in inde-
cent or immoral conduct," is truant, or "is thirteen years of age
or older and has engaged in sexual intercourse with another
person and such other person is thirteen years of age or older
and not more than two years older or younger than such
child."10
In 1977, the legislature abolished the requirement that ju-
venile matters be heard in facilities separate from those housing
other (adult) court business.' 6 The legislation did, however,
mandate that juvenile matters "be kept separate and apart from
all other business of the superior court as far as practicable." 0 7
At the time of our study,'0° the statutes provided for the
transfer of children from the juvenile to the adult criminal
docket, and vice-versa, under a variety of circumstances. The
court automatically transferred those aged fourteen to sixteen
accused of murder and those of that age accused of other seri-
ous felonies who had previously been adjudicated as delinquent
to the adult criminal docket.1 9 The court would initially process
children aged sixteen to eighteen through the adult docket, but
the court could transfer them to the juvenile docket if circum-
stances warranted such a transfer.10 The court could also trans-
fer others over the age of fourteen to the adult docket if "the
child [was] a danger to society and requires more secure and
longer term handling than the juvenile justice system is able to
provide."",
I&
" 1977 Conn. Acts 576 (Reg. Sess.).
07 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-122 (1995).
108 Recent amendments to the Connecticut statutes have broadened the transfer
rules. 1995 Conn. Acts 225 (Reg. Sess.). The rules now provide, for example, for the
transfer ofjuveniles aged 14 and over accused of murder, particular acts committed
with firearms, and lesser acts if the juvenile was previously adjudicated delinquent. Id.
§ 13. The study subjects entered the juvenile justice and mental health systems dur-
ing 1993 and 1994. In this section of the article, we refer to the statutes and rules in
effect at that time.
" CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127 (1995).
'
10 I&
. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-126 (1995). The child must have been accused of a
class A felony or, if previously adjudicated delinquent, a class B or C felony. Id.
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The juvenile criminal process was initiated by a petition to
the superior court. Petitions alleging a neglected, uncared-for,
or dependent child could be filed by the child, her attorney, a
foster parent, a town or its manager or selectmen, a probation
officer, or the commissioner of social services or child and fan-
ily services. 12 Petitions alleging delinquency-the focus of this
study-followed much the same procedure. They were initiated
by petition to the superior court" 3 filed by either a probation of-
ficer or a state's advocate."4
Petitions alleging a neglected, uncared-for, or dependent
child were heard in the judicial district where the child re-
sided."5 Petitions alleging delinquency could, in the court's dis-
cretion, be heard in either the judicial district where the child
resided or where the crime was alleged to have occurred . 6 The
courts almost invariably, however, heard delinquency cases
where the child resided. 117
Prior to any disposition, which could include probation, "al-
ternative incarceration," confinement at home, or placement in
an institution or "wilderness school,"" 8 the statute required that
a probation officer conduct an inquiry into the child's "sur-
roundings," "habits," parents, and "home conditions."" 9 The
probation officer was also required to schedule a meeting with
the child and her parents to discuss the allegations of the com-
plaint and, if the child denied the accusations, schedule a judi-
cial hearing.'2
In addition to requiring that the probation officer conduct
a study, the Connecticut statutes also provided that, "[w]hen it
is found necessary to the disposition," the court could order a
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129(a) (1995).
"' CoNN. Cr. R. § 1027.1 (1994).
114 CONN. Cr. R. § 1023.1(1) (1994).
"' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-142 (1995).
116 Id.
" Telephone Interview with Frank Driscoll, Deputy Director of Connecticut Fam-
ily Division Administration (July 10, 1995).
"' CoNN. GEN. SrAT. § 461>140 (1995).
19 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 461>14 (1995).
" 'CONN. Cr. R. § 1027.1 (1996).
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mental examination.12 1 That order could include "medical, psy-
chiatric, neurological, learning disability and other diagnoses as
the court deem [ed] necessary."'
In essence, these statutes enabled the courts to seek profes-
sional guidance in resolvirig the question that Mr. MacDonald
raised in 1912: do some accused children "need the services of a
good physician more than they do those of the jailor."'2 It was
on the courts' initial action on this question-the decision
whether to refer a child for a mental health evaluation-that
the juvenile criminal justice system component of our study fo-
cused.
III. EXISTING BODY OF KNOWLEDGE
One leading author has summarized the existing empirical
research regarding the disposition of juvenile criminal cases:
"Although there is a relationship between offenses and disposi-
tion, most of the variation in sentencing juveniles remains un-
explained." 4  Perhaps even less is known about the
interrelationship of the juvenile criminal justice and mental
health systems.
A. GENERAL RESEARCH ON THEJUVENILEJUST[CE SYSTEM
A number of observers, relying on a "labeling" theory con-
tending that adolescents are subject to irrevocable stereotypes,
have criticized the juvenile criminal justice system for its inequi-
table treatment of particular races and classes of children.1'
Others have reached inconsistent conclusions when seeking to
provide empirical confirmation of these assertions. For exam-
ple, in 1967, Robert Terry reported on an examination of allju-
121 Id.
"' Id.
1 MACDONALD, supra note 1, at 27.
4 Feld, Transformation, supra note 11, at 715.
2 See, e.g., JOHN M. MARTIN, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, TOWARD A
POlinCAL DEFINITION OF DIoNQUENCy 3 (1970) ("(TIhe juvenile justice labeling proc-
ess works to single out adolescents from groups culturally alien to those in power.");
EDWIN M. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION: RETHINEING THE DELNQUENCY PROBLEM
121 (1973) ("[T]he philosophy of the juvenile court... virtually ensures that stereo-
types will influence judicial dispositions.").
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venile court appearances during a six year period in Racine,
Wisconsin. 6 Although his initial evaluation revealed more se-
vere dispositions for members of minority and lower socio-
economic classes, the differences disappeared when he con-
trolled for number of previous offenses and the seriousness of
the current charge. 1'
Two subsequent studies reached contrary conclusions. In
1971, William Arnold reported on data drawn from juvenile
courts in a variety of southern states.12 8 Even when controlling
for the number and seriousness of the offenses and other fac-
tors,129 the study revealed a relationship between race and eth-
nicity and the severity of the disposition."' In 1973, Terence
Thornberry reported similar findings on data obtained in
Philadelphia.'3 ' In particular, he concluded that unlike previous
studies the data he studied revealed that "Blacks and low [socio-
economic status] subjects were more likely than whites and high
[socioeconomic status] subjects to receive severe dispositions" at
all stages ofjuvenile criminal justice procedure. 2
In 1975, Lawrence Cohen criticized all existing research,
contending that because the studies focused on single courts or
single variables, they provided little "empirical evidence to sus-
tain or negate... "the charges of an inequitable juvenile justice
system.' 3 To fill this research void, Mr. Cohen offered a multi-
'" Robert M. Terry, The Screening ofJuvenile Offenders, 58J. Cpm. L., CRuMNoLoyY&
PouicESci. 173 (1967).
'RId. at 177-78.
'William R. Arnold, Race and Ethnicity Relative to Other Factors in Juvenile Court Dis-
positions, 77AM.J. Soc. 211 (1971).
'" Id. at 214. Professor Arnold also controlled for the marital status of the of-
fender's parents. I&/
'" Id. at 217-23.
.. Terence P. Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile
Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L & CRIHNOLOGY 90 (1973). Professor Thornberry also
controlled for prior record and severity of offense. Id. at 94.
1,2 Id. at 97 (referring to the police, intake, and court disposition steps of the proc-
ess).
' LAWRENcE E. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY DIsposrToNs: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROCESSING DECISIONS IN THR JuvENEL COURTS 14 (1975).
Cohen analyzed the data for four types of dispositions-informal adjustment by the
probation officer, case held open while juvenile received care at private facility, for-
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ple regression study of data obtained from courts in Colorado,
Tennessee, and Pennsylvania.' After finding a number of cor-
relates with severity of offense-low socioeconomic status, "bro-
ken home," and nonwhite racial status, Mr. Cohen employed
multi-variate techniques to control for prior offenses and the se-
verity of the current offense. He concluded that neither socio-
economic status nor ethnicity were "major determinant[s] of
disposition" of the juveniles he studied.'-
Subsequent research has corroborated earlier studies and
contradicted Mr. Cohen's conclusion.1 s As Barry Feld has
summarized it, the literature supports two conclusions. "First,
the present offense and prior record account for most of the
variation in sentencing that can be explained. Second, after
controlling for offense variables, individualized discretion is of-
ten synonymous with racial disparities in sentencing."
1 37
These assertions lead to two conclusions regarding the func-
tion of the juvenile justice system. First, to the extent that of-
fense variables like prior record and severity of offense are the
best predictors of a sentence, then the juvenile criminal justice
system has abandoned the goal of providing treatment accord-
ing to the offenders' needs and has, instead, embraced the no-
tion of punishment. Second, the juvenile criminal justice
system appears to have produced inequity precisely to the ex-
tent that it has held true to its originally stated mission of basing
disposition on characteristics of the offender rather than of the
offense.
mal supervised probation, and incarceration in juvenile facility or prosecution in
adult court-of three, urban courts. Id. at 20 tbl. 2.
Id. at 15-16.
'"Id. at 5--54. Minority status correlated with disposition only for those who were
formally petitioned in one court Cohen studied and for those who were not detained
in another court. Id. at 54. Otherwise, Cohen apparently found that ethnicity was
not correlated with disposition. See id.
" For a summary of recent research, see generally Carl E. Pope & William H. Fey-
erhern, Minority Status and juvenile justice Processing. An Assessnent of the Research Litera-
ture, 22 CaIM.JuST. BSTRATcS 527,528 (1990).
7 Feld, Transformation, supra note 11, at 714.
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B. CORRECTIONAL VERSUS MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS.
Research on the relationship between the correctional and
mental health systems mirrors the general research on disposi-
tion. It consists of conflicting reports on the presence of bias
and reveals a system dependent on the caprice of individual
judges.
In 1970, T.G. Tennent published one of the earliest articles
that raised the issue whether there are differences between ju-
veniles judged delinquent and those brought before the juve-
nile court for other reasons.ss Studying all truancy and
delinquency cases brought before the Inner London Juvenile
Courts during the 1966-67 school year, Tennent reached two
conclusions. He found significant psychiatric differences be-
tween the delinquent and truant populations appearing before
the juvenile courts, as measured by a "psychiatrist's global clini-
cal impression." 9 On the other hand, he asserted that "the
problems and backgrounds of children appearing before Juve-
nile Courts," truant and delinquent alike, "are often closely
similar" to those of children receiving treatment in mental
health facilities.' 40
Research in this country has not always replicated Tennent's
second finding. For example, in 1977, Shelley Shanok and
Dorothy Lewis compared populations in a juvenile court psychi-
atric guidance clinic and a child psychiatric guidance clinic serv-
ing the same geographic region of Connecticut.14 ' Although the
children in both institutions exhibited similar "organic and psy-
chotic symptoms," the researchers did find significantly differ-
ent "characterological, adjustment, [and] neurotic symptoms." 142
', T.G. Tennent, Truancy and Stealing. A Comparative Study of Education Act Cases and
Prer Offenders, 116 BRrr.J. PSYcHIATRY 587 (1970).
'" Id. at 592. Tennent derived the "global" impressions from psychiatric reports in
the offenders' files. Id. at 588. An assessment method based on "six separate 'Area'
scores compiled for each boy so as to yield an individual profile of adjustment," id. at
588, did not, however, reveal any difference between the populations. Id. at 592.
,
40Westendorp et al., supra note 6, at 239 (quoting Tennent).
Shelley S. Shanok & Dorothy Otnow Lewis, Juvenile Court Versus Child Guidance
Referral: Psychosocial and ParentalFactors, 134 AM.J. PSYCMATRY 1130, 1130 (1977).
'0 Id. at 1131.
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In addition, they observed differences in social class and family
composition between the two groups.
14 3
In 1979, Lewis, Shanok, and another collaborator focused
their attention on the racial disparities between the correctional
and mental health systems.'" Reporting on their clinical obser-
vations from the same juvenile court clinic on which they based
their 1977 publication, the researchers recited a number of an-
ecdotes of racial bias. For example, they asserted that "seriously
disturbed black delinquents have trouble gaining admission to
therapeutic facilities [and that] those who were admitted were
quick to be discharged."'4 The researchers buttressed their ob-
servations with a modest amount of epidemiological evidence
derived from a different study. Referring to a study of 109 chil-
dren "known to the juvenile court,",4 6 they reported racial dif-
ferences in whether children or their parents had received
psychiatric treatment.
In 1980 Lewis, Shanok, and some collaborators published
more direct epidemiological support for their contentions.4
For a given year they examined the records of all adolescents
from an urban area of Connecticut who entered the state cor-
rectional school and all adolescents from that same area who
during that same year entered the state mental health facility.
49
They scrutinized the data using a multiple regression analysis of
independent variables including numbers of accidents and inju-
ries through age sixteen, number of face and head injuries
through age sixteen, sex, and race. They concluded that "[t] he
most powerful variable distinguishing the groups was race,
t4 Id. at 1132. Eighty-six percent of the juvenile court clinic children came from
families in lower socioeconomic classes; 74% of the child guidance clinic children
did. Id. A statistically significantly greater percentage of the children in juvenile
court clinics came from large families (three or more children). Id.
'"Lewis et al.,Juvenile Offenders, supra note 6.
1 Id. at 54.
' Id. at 55. They referred to Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Toward Undestanding the
Fathers of Delinquents: Psychodynamic Medical and Genetic Perspectives, in A
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF ACING OUT (Eveoleen N. Rexford, ed.
1982).
147 Lewis et al.,Juvenie Offenders, supra note 6, at 55-56.
Lewis et al., ViolentAdolescnts, supra note 6.
4 Id. at 1211-12.
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which accounted for 18.1% of the variance."15 ° When repeating
the regression analysis and coding both accident and injury
categories in binary "yes" or "no" fashion, the number of head
or face injuries proved the most powerful predictor (30.2% of
the variance) and race was the second best predictor (16.7% of
the variance).1
In 1986 Westendorp et al. published the results of a similar
study which they conducted in Michigan.52 Attempting to build
on the work of Lewis and Shanok,5 3 the researchers compared
the patients in six mental health treatment programs with ado-
lescents from the same area placed in the juvenile justice pro-
gram' " In sum, the researchers found that race, gender, and
marital history of the parents (whether divorced) were signifi-
cant in predicting whether an adolescent would enter the juve-
nile justice or mental health systems.10 The variable social class
was not significant.'56 In addition, other variables, including
mental health history, current drug use, parental religious af-
filiation, MMPI depression scale, and CAAP productivity scales
were significant.
57
In 1992, Kaplan and Busner set out to test whether the find-
ings of the Lewis and Westendorp research groups held in New
York State.'58 Conducting the largest project on the subject to
date, the researchers examined the records of all 1,474 children
aged ten to eighteen admitted to state mental health facilities in
1988 and all 1,405 admitted to state juvenile justice facilities that
159
same year.
"0 Id. at 1214.
" Id. The researchers subsequently published a similar study of delinquent and
nondelinquent patients in the mental health facility. Shelly S. Shanok et al., A Com-
parison of Delinquent and Nondelinquent Adolescent Psychiatric Inpatients, 140 AM. J.
PSYcHIATRY 582 (1983).
"'Westendorp et al., supra note 6.




117 Id. The MMPI measures personality and psychopathology; the CAAP measures
social adjustment. Id. at 23.
Kaplan & Busner, supra note 7.
'"Id. at 769.
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The initial findings were consistent with those of the Lewis
and Westendorp groups: 23% of the children and adolescents
in the mental health facilities were Black; 56% of those in the
juvenile justice system were Black.' 6° Thus, asserted Kaplan and
Busner, had they employed the same types of statistical analyses
as the other researchers, "[the] results would have been similar
to theirs."'
Instead of comparing the two populations, however, Kaplan
and Busner, using the Chi-square statistic, compared the racial
distributions of the institutional samples with the distribution in
the general population of the same age groups.62 In so doing,
they found no evidence of bias in the mental health system, but
significant evidence of bias in the juvenile justice system.
More recent research has criticized both the juvenile jus-
ticer' and mental health systems'65 for racial and other biases.
These studies have not, however, sought to compare the two sys-
tems and, thus, have not further illuminated the issue which
Kaplan and Busner addressed.
C. THE INTERSECTON OF THE GRIMINALJUSTICE AND MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEMS
Prior studies have shed substantial light on the juvenile jus-
tice and mental health systems. At the very least, they provide
sufficient evidence to spur further research regarding the rea-
sons for the apparent inequities in disposition. And, though in-
consistent on the issue of racial disparity in mental health
facilities, the studies have consistently found that racial minori-
ties are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.
16 Id.
1' Id. at 770.
The researchers stipulated that, "[twofold or greater differences in population-
corrected admission rates are considered meaningful." Id. at 769.
"Id. at 769-70.
'" See, e.g., RobertJ. Sampson &John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court
Processing. Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control, 27 L. & Soc'y REv. 285, 305
(1993).
' See, e.g., Steven P. Cuffe et al., Race and Gender Differences in the Treatment of Psy-
chiatric Disorders in Young Adolescents, 34J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOIMC. PSYCHIATRY
1536 (1995); Mark D. Kilgus et al., Influence of Race on Diagnosis in Adolescent Psychiatric
Inpatients, 34J. AM. AcAD. CHumL & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1995).
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Prior studies, however, have failed to illuminate the inter-
section of the juvenile justice and mental health systems. As
Kaplan and Busner noted, the mental health and criminal jus-
tice systems "are largely independent."1'6 On the one hand, ju-
veniles enter the criminal justice system only by court order.
On the other hand, in addition to entrance through court re-
ferral, they enter the mental health system through a number of
referral sources, including "private hospitals, school systems,
and parental referral." 67 Indeed, Kaplan and Busner found that
the courts had referred only 17% of their mental health system
study subjects."6
"Because there are different points of entry to the mental
health and juvenile justice systems," Kaplan and Busner con-
cluded, "the entry of a disproportionate number of black chil-
dren and adolescents to the juvenile justice system does not
imply racial bias on the part of the mental health system."' 69 De-
termining whether a bias exists would entail studying a number
of variables, including "the prevalence of psychiatric disorders
in minority groups, help-seeking behaviors in minority groups,
and gatekeepers' behavior," of which currently "there is little
knowledge."'170
By limiting its inquiry to a common path of entry into the
two systems-the courts-our study avoided this limitation and,
at least for the purposes of examining court-referrals for mental
health evaluation, the need to study all of the variables that Kap-
lan and Busner identify. And, in so doing, this study illumi-
nated another previously unstudied topic: the pre-disposition
reference to the mental health system for psychiatric evaluation.
In addition, this study was the first to compare the court-
referred and clinically-referred populations within the mental
health systems. This facet of the study facilitated the first de-
tailed comparison of the demographic attributes and psychiatric
'6 Kaplan & Busner, supra note 7, at 770.
167Id.
"A Id. at 770-71.
"' Id.
70 Id. at 771.
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We examined the populations of two state institutions for
the fiscal year running from July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1994.
The statejuvenile correctional school ("Correctional School") is
a residential facility that, at any given time, serves approximately
200 of the state's most serious juvenile offenders. We studied all
229 adolescents that the state's courts referred to the school
during the fiscal year who did not also receive a referral for psy-
chiatric evaluation at the other institution we studied-the state
psychiatric hospital (the "Hospital").
The Hospital is Connecticut's only state-operated psychiat-
ric facility for children and adolescents. It is an eighty-four-bed
free-standing psychiatric hospital for children and adolescents
aged five to seventeen. We compared two samples admitted
during the fiscal year. The first consisted of all 126 children
and adolescents referred to the Hospital by clinicians ("clini-
cally-referred"), including psychiatrists, psychologists and social
workers. Admission criteria include danger to self or others,
gravely disabled, and major psychiatric diagnosis or severe dys-
function.
The second Hospital sample consisted of all ninety-three
adolescents that the state's courts referred to the Hospital for a
thirty-day psychiatric evaluation. 7' Courts are encouraged to
abide by the Hospital's admission criteria, but the Hospital is
mandated to accept for evaluation all court-referred patients re-
gardless of whether they meet the criteria.
1 The authorizing statute provides: "[When] it is found necessary to the disposi-
tion," the court may order a mental examination. That order may include "medical,
psychiatric, neurological, learning disability diagnoses and such other diagnoses as




a. The Correctional School
We obtained data from the Correctional School from a
computer printout of the 241 subjects admitted during the
study period. 72 The computer printout provided information
on seven independent variables: gender, age, race, court dis-
trict, family constellation, home town size, and criminal charge.
We coded family constellation in eleven categories: mother
& father, mother only, father only, mother & stepfather, father
& stepmother, grandmother & grandfather, grandmother,
grandfather, foster home, child welfare agency ward, and other.
We coded the severity of criminal charge on a ten point
scale ranging from running away to sexual assault and other vio-
lent offenses. 73
b. The Hospital
We obtained the data from the hospital by a chart review of
the ninety-three court-ordered and 126 clinically-referred pa-
' To facilitate a comparison of those whom the courts referred for mental health
evaluation with those whom the courts did not refer, we removed from the sample
those 12 subjects who were referred to the Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation (they
were counted in the Hospital sample), reducing the number of subjects to 229.
" We adapted our scale from CoHEN, supra note 14 (1975). Cohen polled proba-
tion officers and judges to develop a hierarchy of seven categories of offenses ranging
from "unruly offense" to "violent offense." Id. at 19 tbl.1.
In order to classify more subtly the offenses that might lead to a mental health re-
ferral but not to commitment to the Correctional School, we used a hierarchy of 10
categories of offenses: (1) running away, (2) truancy, (3) unruly behavior at home
(including confrontations and difficulties with family members and what admission
and referral notes termed "out of control behavior at home"), (4) suicidal behavior
(included suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), (5) unruly behavior in the com-
munity and miscellaneous offenses (included breach of the peace, interference with
police officers, criminal mischief, use of an automobile without the owner's permis-
sion, possession of burglary tools, cruelty to animals, violation of court and probation
orders, one case of wrongful disinterment, and what admission and referral notes
termed "out of control behavior at school or in the community"), (6) illegal use or
possession of alcohol, (7) illegal use or possession of drugs or other controlled sub-
stances, (8) property and theft offenses (included robbery, larceny, burglary and all
other forms of theft, trespassing, and possession of firearms), (9) sexual assault, and
(10) other violent offenses (included all forms of assault and arson).
We classified charges of attempts and conspiracies to commit offenses in the cate-
gory of the offense attempted or the subjects of the conspiracy.
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tients admitted during the study period. We coded over thirty
variables in four categories of independent variables.
i. Sociodemographic data and family and patient history
We obtained this information from the admission notes
completed by the Hospital's admitting physician.
ii. Criminal charge
We obtained the information about criminal charge (for
the court-ordered subjects) from several different sources.
Three files contained police reports identifying the charges. Six
contained the -petition filed by the prosecutor stating the
charges. Sixty-eight presented the charges in referral notes
completed by the Hospital's social worker during a telephone
conference with juvenile justice personnel. Fifteen presented
the charges only in admission notes completed by the Hospital's
admitting physician. 7 4
iii. Patient functioning while in hospital
In addition to length of stay, we also sought to document
violent or disruptive behavior. To this end, we recorded the
number of seclusions and documented aggressive acts toward
staff and peers in the first thirty days of hospitalization.
iv. Diagnostic information
The psychiatrist on our team obtained diagnostic informa-
tion from the discharge summary completed by the admitting
physician at the end of the patient's stay in the hospital. We
employed a multi-faceted coding scheme to record the informa-
tion. We began with a methodology that echoed the dichotomy
between "classical" and "general/behavioral" disorders which
Paul Lerham addressed in Deinstitutionalization and the Welfare
174 In most cases, the sources presented relatively consistent information. In two
files the sources reported materially inconsistent information. The admission note in
one file reported as the criminal allegation that the patient "has been getting into
trouble in school, home, and in the community." The referral form reported first
degree conspiracy to commit sexual assault and third degree wrongful constraint.
The admission note in another file reported "long-standing behavior problems in
home and school." The referral form reported charges of assault, possession of a
weapon, and breach of peace. Whenever the information differed in any respect, we
relied on the source least removed from the context of the original charges, resulting
in the following source hierarchy- police report, court petition, referral note, admis-
sion note.
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State.tm Working from a modern adolescent psychiatry text, we
assigned diagnoses to the "two broad band factors" which iden-
tify psychiatric disorders: internalizing and externalizing disor-
ders. 76 The internalizing disorders include schizoid/anxious
disorders, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorders, and social
withdrawal." The extemalizing disorders include "hyperactiv-
ity, aggression, and delinquency."m
We recorded self-reported substance abuse and substance
use disorder as articulated in the leading psychiatric diagnostic
manual, DSM-IV: "a maladaptive pattern of substance use mani-
fested by recurrent and significant adverse consequences re-
lated to the repeated use of substances."'7m
We also obtained data on pervasive developmental disorders
and psychotic disorders. DSM-IV defines a pervasive develop-
mental disorder as "characterized by severe and pervasive im-
pairment in several areas of development: reciprocal social
interaction skills, communication skills, or the presence of
stereotyped behavior, interests, and activities."'80 DSM-IV de-
fines psychotic disorders to include symptomatology such as
"delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, [and] grossly
disorganized or catatonic behavior."1
8
'
Finally, we recorded two variables which measure overall
functioning level. DSM-IV provides that the Global Assessment
of Functioning Scale (GAF) considers "psychological, social,
and occupational functioning on a hypothetical [zero to one
hundred] continuum of mental-health illness."' In addition,
' See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lerman's work.
"' Vanshdeep Sharma et al., Disruptive Behavior Disorders: Assessment and Differential
Diagnosis, inDIsRuPnW DisoRDERs 253, 257 (Laurence L. Greenhill, M.D., ed., 1994).
' Id. at 258.
7 Id.
7 AMEICAN PSYC-IATRIc ASsOcIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTALDISORDERS 182 (4th ed., 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
'so Id. at 65.
' Id. The definition applies to unspecified psychotic disorders. Id. We included
in this diagnosis all other specific DSM-IV psychotic disorders: brief psychotic disor-
der, shared psychotic disorder, psychotic disorder due to a general medical condi-
tion, and substance-induced and psychotic disorder. Id. at 302-15.
'n Id. at 32.
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we recorded the number of "stressors'--the uniformly recog-
nized life events that impart stress-on a one-to-five scale.8
3. Analyses
We organized results in three parts. For those independent
variables for which we had data for all three samples, we em-
ployed ANOVA, Chi-square, and logistic and multiple regression
tests to measure differences among the samples. To conduct
two-way comparisons between the criminal justice and mental
health samples and the court-referred and clinically-referred




We obtained data for all three samples for the following in-
dependent variables: age, gender, race, and size of home town.
As table 1 reveals, each was statistically significantly different
among the samples. The clinically-referred Hospital patients
were the youngest (13.27 years), the court-referred hospital pa-
tients were next oldest (14.13 years), and the Correctional
School residents were oldest (14.66 years). All populations were
predominantly male, but the Correctional School population
was most dramatically so (84.7% male). Both Hospital samples
were relatively evenly split between Whites and Non-whites
(court-referred were 58% White and 42% Non-white, clinically-
referred were 50% each); the Correctional School population
was nearly 82% Non-white. Finally, approximately one fourth of
both Hospital samples (21.51% of the Court-ordered and
'u See David A. Tomb, Adjustment Disorder, in CEL AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATR. A
CoMREHENSIV TEXOOK 727, 729 (Melvin Lewis, ed., 2d ed. 1996).
'" For detailed definitions of the statistical tests see generally James T. McClave &
Frank H. Dietrich, STATISTICS (5th ed., 1991). The T-test measures differences in
means between samples. Id. at 391. An ANOVA performs the same test for more
than two samples. Id. at 452. A Chi-square test measures variability between samples.
Id. at 369. Regression formulas construct probabilistic models representing the rela-
tionship between an outcome variable and a number of independent variables. See id.
at 638-39. For all measures, we employed the .05 convention of statistical signifi-
cance. See id. at 330.
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30.83% of the clinically referred) resided in communities with
populations of 125,000 or larger; nearly half (44%) of the Cor-




No. % No. % No "- Measure Prob.
Number 93 - 126 - L2 . V_
Age
Mean 14,13- 13.27 - 1446-




Males 57 61.3 71 58.20 U19- ,,8
Females '6 38.7 51 41.80 IN T I
Comparison i1 -  .001
35.54
Race
Caucasian -54 58.1 62 50.00 4-2 10-3
Non-Caucasian 39 4h9 62 50.00 [-1 - 1 .-- -- I
Comparison X-- -  .001
65.57
Home Town
>125,000 20 21.51 37 30.83 99 -l00
Smaller 73 78A9 83 69.17 -126 -5,00
Comparison I ---  .001
16.169
As shown in Table 2, our stepwise, multiple logistic regres-
sion model, which we employed to ascertain the interactions
among our independent variables, revealed that only race (Chi-
square of 21.32 and probability of .0001) and age (Chi-square of
12.32 and probability of .0004) are statistically significant in dis-
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tinguishing among the three groups. This confirmed two find-
ings that we have reported elsewhere with respect to only the
Correctional School and court-ordered samples."" Size of home
town was meaningful only because it reflected the racial
makeup of the subjects' communities of residence.'t s In addi-
tion, gender differences appeared to be a proxy for the severity
of the offense with which the subject had been charged."'
Table 2
Results of Stepwise Multiple Logistic Regression
_X
2  Probability
Intercept (Group) 9.35 .0022
Race (bifurcated) 21.32 .0001
Age 12.32 .0004
Gender 1.87 .1715
2. Correctional School vs. Court-ordered Mental Health Referral
a. Severity of offense
The data regarding severity of offense, as reported in table
3, permitted several significant observations. First, when all
conduct, including the first four categories of offenses which
are essentially non-criminal "status" offenses were included, t
the samples exhibited statistically significant different severity
distributions (Chi-square of 77.206; probability of .001). The
difference remained significant when those twenty Hospital sub-
jects who committed these offenses were removed from the
analysis (Chi-square of 29.073; probability of .001).
"' W. John Thomas & Dorothy E. Stubbe, A Comparison of Correctional and Mental
Health Referrals in the Juvenile Court, 24J. PSYCH. & L. 379 (1996).
6 Id. at 388.
Id. at 391-92.
The subjects, of course, could not be referred to a correctional facility for these




Second, a greater percentage of the hospitalized subjects
(15.1%) than the incarcerated subjects (2.6%) had been
charged with sexual assault. On the other hand, a greater per-
centage of the incarcerated subjects (21%) than the hospital-
ized subjects (6.5%) had been charged with illegal drug usage.
Additional investigation revealed that relationships between
sexual assault and referral for mental health evaluation (chi-
square of 16.91; probability of .001) and illegal drug usage and
non-referral for mental health evaluation (chi-square of 10.52;
probability of .001) were statistically significant.
Third, a greater percentage of the hospitalized subjects
(32.26%) than the incarcerated subjects (19.28%) had been
charged with violent assault. On the other hand, because one
must be charged with a criminal offense to be incarcerated, a
greater percentage of the incarcerated subjects (100%) than the
hospitalized subjects (78.49%) had been charged with criminal
offenses. The relationship between violent assault and referral
for mental health evaluation (chi-square of 6.22; probability of
.013) was statistically significant. Not surprisingly, the relation-
ship between criminal offense and non-referral for mental
health evaluating was also statistically significant (chi-square of
51.20; probability of .001).
6471999]
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Table 3:
Relationship Between Offense and Referral
for a Mental Health Evaluation.
Hospital Correctional School
N- I% IN I ' IProbability
Detailed Classification
(1) running away I Li 0 0.0
(2) truancy 5 5.4 0 0.0
(3) unruly at home 10 10.8 0 0.0
(4) suicidal behavior 4- 4.3 0 0.0
(5) unruly in 1 16.1 52 22.7
community _
(6) alcohol 1 1.1 3 1.3
(7) drugs 6 6.5 48 21.0
(8) property and theft 21 22.6 77 33.6
(9) sexual assault 14 15.1 6 2.6
(10) other violent 16 17.2 37 16.2
Missing - - 6 2.6
Comparison
All offenses ______77.206 .001
Criminal offenses _ _29-,073 .001
Criminal Offense?
Non-Criminal 20 21.51 0 0.00
Criminal 73 78.49 223 100.00
Comparison 51.20 .001
Sexual assault7
Sexual assault 14 15.1 6 2.6
All others 79 85.0 217 97.4
Comparison 16.91 .001
Drug offense?
Drugs 6 6.5 48 21.0
All others 87 93.51 75 70.9
Comparison 10.52 .001
Violent Offense?
Violent 30 32.26 43 19.28




b. Multi-variate analysis: The regression model.
As Table 4 reveals, the four best predictors of referral for a
mental health evaluation were, in descending order of signifi-
cance, race (bifurcated between White and Non-white), whether
the subject was accused of a sex offense, age, and severity of of-
fense. The variables that appeared significant in bivariate analy-
sis but not in the regression analysis-home town, judicial
district, drug offense, and gender-were significantly associated
with other independent variables (hometown, judicial district,
and drug offense with race; severity with gender), but not with
referral for mental health evaluation.
Table 4
Results of Stepwise Multiple Logistic Regression
Intercept (Group) 35.82 .0001
Race (bifurcated) 41.26 .0001
Sex Offense 19.71 .0001
Age 13.43 .0002
Severity of Offense 6.29 .0121
C. COURT-ORDERED VS. CLINICALLY REFERRED
1. Univariate Analysis
a. Basic demographic differences.
As table 5 reveals, age was the only demographic variable that
proved statistically significant: the clinically-referred were
younger (t value of 2.97 and probability of .003) than the court-
ordered. Both samples were approximately 60% male (61.29%
for court-ordered and 58.20% for clinically-referred) and ap-
proximately 75% of both (78.49% of the court-ordered and
69.17% of the clinically-referred) were from communities with
populations of less than 125,000. Perhaps most dramatic, al-
though we found statistically significant differences in the racial
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makeup in comparing the correctional school and court-
ordered hospital samples (Chi-square of 49.9 and probability of
.001), for the same time period there was no statistically signifi-
cant difference between that court-ordered sample and the
clinically-referred sample admitted to the Hospital (Chi-square
of 1.685 and probability of .194). The juveniles which the
courts referred statistically mirrored those which clinicians re-
ferred.
The lone difference in these measures was whether state
protective services were involved with the family. Curiously, the
state agency was more likely to be involved with the families of
the clinically-referred than with the court-ordered patients
(64.75% vs. 41.76%; Chi-square of 11.133 and probability of
.001). Perhaps state involvement leads to the involvement of a
mental health professional which, in turn, results in a referral to
the hospital. Those who do not receive the attention of the








Mean _ _ _ 13.27 -





Males 5 - -V 71 58.20
Females 36 n- 7 I 51 41.80
Missing - - 4 --
Comparison __ _0.2__.647
Race
Caucasian i . 62 49.21
Non- 39 . 64 50.79
CaucasianComparison 7 =.85.194
Size of Hometown
>125,000 _ 24.51 37 30.83
Smaller S 8A9 83 69.17
Missing 6 -
Comparison -- .326 .127
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No. - % No. % X) Probability
Family Involvement in Evaluation
Yes 78 84.78 103 87.29
No 14 15.22 15 12.71
Missing 1 - 8 -
C6mparison 0.27.3 .602
State Protective Services Agency Involvement
Yes 38 41.76 79 64.75
No 53 [58.24 43 35.25
Missing 3 3 -
Comparison 11.133 .001
Patient Lived with Family During Last Three Months
Yes 59 67.82 66 55.93
No 28 32.18 52 44.07
Missing 6 - 8 -
Comparison ....... _ __.........___ 2.972 .085
Has Family Moved in Past Twelve Months?
Yes 21 24.71 15 23.44
No 64 75.29 49 76.56 I







_ No. % F% Probability
History of Incarceration/arrest in Mother
Yes 1' 162 17 21.79
No 63 78.75 61 78.21
Missing 13 - 48 -
Comparison G.00, .934
History of Incarceration/arrest in Father
Yes 29,7 89 _ 24 40.68
No 42 6O28q 35 59.32
Missing 24 - 67 -
Comparison 0.004 .952
History of Incarceration/arrest in Other Family Members
Yes 29 4 20 40.00
No 36 55.-38 30 60.00









No I % No. % XT [Probability
History of Psychiatric Illness in Mother
Yes 39 47.56 58 59.18
No 43 52.44 40 40.82
Missing 11 - 28 -
Comparison 2.427 .119
History of Psychiatric Illness in Father
Yes 20 29.85 22 37.29
No 47 70.15 37 62.71
Missing 26 - 67 -
Comparison 0.7810 .377
History of Psychiatric Illness in Other Family Members
Yes 49 69.01 56 72.73
No 22 . 30-99 21 27.27




Family Substance Abuse History
Court ordered Clinically-referred I I
No. % No. % X' Probability
History of Substance Abuse in Mother
Yes 4 5L.85 52 52.53
No 481f5 47 47.47
Missing 12 - 27 -
Comparison 0.008& .928
History of Substance Abuse in Father
Yes 60 77.92 66 80.49
No 17 22.8 16 19.51
Missing 16 - 44 -
Comparison 0 .690
History of Substance Abuse in Other Family Members
Yes 84) 8&96 66 85.71
No 9 13.04 11 14.29
Missing 24 - 49 -
Comparison 0.048 .827
d. Patient history.
As shown in Table 10, the study revealed a single difference
between the histories of the clinically- and court-referred pa-
tients. The clinically-referred were more likely to have been
hospitalized (Chi-square value of 31.542 and probability of
.001). Yet, we observed no other distinguishing factors that
would explain that early hospitalization. There were no signifi-
cant differences regarding age of first psychiatric hospitaliza-
tion, or histories of physical or sexual abuse or gang
involvement.
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Table 10
Patient History
Court-Ordered ] Clinically-Referred I
No. % No. %x or t Probability
Prior Psychiatric Hospitalization
Yes 45 51.14 104 86.67
No 43 48.86 16 13.33
Missing 5 - 6 -
Comparison .001
31.542
Age of First Psychiatric Hospitalization
Mean 110.961- 9.76 -
SD 10.15 4.04 -
Missing 2 - 0 -
Comparison t-1.061 .291
Patient Histoiy of Physical Abuse
Yes 44 50.57 68 63.55
No 3 49.43 39 36.45
Missing 6 --- 19 --
Comparison XZ=  .069
3.311
Patient History of Sexual Abuse
Yes 40 45.98 58 58.00
No 47 54.02 42 42.00
Missing 6 - 26 --
Comparison .101
2.696
Patient History of Gang Involvement
Yes 24 26.97 15 16.30
No 65 73.03 77 83.70
Missing 4 -- 33 --
Comparison 1.0 -  .081





Patient Functioning in Hospital
Court- Clinically-Ordered Referred
No. 1% No. % )?or t Probability
Length of Stay (in days)
Mean 51.26 - 131.24 -
S.D. 48.89 - 117.71 -
Missing 3 - 2 -
Comparison t= .0001
6.801
Physically Aggressive Toward Staff
Yes 8 9.09 29 27.10
No 80 90.91 78 72.90
Missing 5 - 19 -
Comparison j2- .001
10.190
Patient Aggressive Toward Peers
Yes 5 5.68 27 25.23
No 83 94.32 80 74.77




Mean 1.80 - 4.41 -
S.D. 4.05 - 10.74 -
Missing 3 - 5 -
Comparison t= .0165
I_ I 1 1 -2.422
e. Patient functioning in hospital.
All of our measures of functioning in the hospital indicated
that the court-referred patients were better behaved during the
first thirty days of stay, and that these differences were statisti-
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cally significant.'8 As Table 11 shows, the court-referred pa-
tients exhibited fewer incidents of aggression toward staff (Chi-
square value of 10.19 and probability of .001), and peers (Chi-
square value of 13.457 and probability of .001), and fewer seclu-
sions (t value of -2.422 and probability of .0165). As a former
juvenile justice system probation officer put it, "the courts have
scared these kids."1 Faced with negative consequences in the
juvenile justice system, the court-referred may have exhibited
better self-control while hospitalized.
f Psychiatric diagnoses.
There were no statistically significant differences between
the samples with respect to internalizing disorders, develop-
mental disorders, or diagnosed substance abuse disorders. As
shown in Table 12, there were differences with respect to self-
reported substance abuse: the court-referred patients were more
likely to report abuse (Chi-square value of 12.351 and probabil-
ity of .001). Evidently, clinicians did not perceive any differ-
ences.
Our most notable finding concerned the patients' central
psychiatric diagnoses. The court-referred patients were more
likely to be diagnosed with externalizing disorders (Chi-square
value of 19.059 and probability of .001). On the other hand,
the clinically referred patients were more likely to be diagnosed
with psychotic disorders (Chi-square value of 17.273 and prob -
ability of .001). Thus, the court-referred patients were more
likely to suffer from hyperactivity and aggression191 while the
clinically-referred were more likely to suffer from delusions or
hallucinations.
Finally, we observed no statistically significant differences on
our two measures of overall functioning. Over 60% of both the
court-referred and clinically-referred exhibited four to five stres-
,89 We recorded events of aggression or violence for the first thirty days of stay. See
supra Part IV.A.2.b.ii.
'9 Audience member, presentation at the March, 1997 grand rounds of the Yale
Child Study Center.
... See supra text accompanying note 178 for a definition of externalizing disorders.
" See supra text accompanying notes 180-81 for a definition of psychotic disorders.
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sors. In addition, both groups had GAF scores just above forty.
That score indicates that a majority of both samples exhibited
serious symptoms of psychiatric illness such a suicidal ideation
or suffered a serious impairment in functioning at school, work,
or in the family.19'
2. Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis.
As Table 13 indicates, a stepwise logistic regression con-
firmed our univariate findings that four variables distinguished
the court-referred and clinically-referred samples: Age (the
clinically-referred were younger-Chi-square value of 8.806 and
probability of .003), whether the patient had been previously
hospitalized in a psychiatric facility (the clinically-referred were
more likely to have been hospitalized-Chi-square value of
22.599 and probability of .0001), whether the patient had been
diagnosed with a externalizing disorder (the court-referred pa-
tients were more likely to be so diagnosed--Chi-square value of
5.481 and probability of .0192), and whether the patient had
been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (the court-referred
patients were more likely to be so diagnosed--Chi-square value
of 12.519 and probability of .0004).





Court Referred I Clinically Referred
No. % No. o% X°rt Probability
Internalizing Disorders
Yes 54 58.70 84 67.20
No 38 41.30 41 32.80
Missing 1 - I -
Comparison Xz=I, 656  .198
Externalizing Disorders
Yes 79 85.87 73 58.40
No 13 14.13 52 41.60
Missing 1 - I -
Comparison X =19.05 9  .001
Developmental Disorders
Yes 30 32.61 53 42.40
No 62 67.39 72 57.60
Missing I - 1 -
Comparison X =2.15 1  .142
Diagnosed Substance Abuse Disorder
Yes 34 36.96 32 25.81
No 58 63.04 92 74.19
Missing 1 - 2 -
Comparison -3.094 .079
Self-reported Substance Use
Yes 57 61.96 40 37.04
No 35 38.04 68 62.96
Missing 1 - 18 -
Comparison X -12. 35 1  .001
Psychotic Disorders
Yes 2 2.17 27 21.60
No 90 97.83 98 78.40
Missing 1 - 1 -
Comparison X -17.273 .001
(Table continued on following page)
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Court-Ordered j Clinically-Referred I
No. % No. I % [ t - Probability
Stressors
0-1 0 0.00 1 00.80
2 9 9.78 6 04.80
3 f f 26- 28 22.40
4 A 58.70 -  75 60.00
5 3 12-2 15 12.00
Missing I -
Comparison W :-' .082
Bifurcated Stressors Variable
0-3 35 38.04 34 27.42
4-5 5 61.96 90 72.58
Missing 1 - 2 -
Comparison I 74 , .098
GAF Score
Mean 4-.8 - 143.18 I-
S.D. 9-55 - 14.57 -
Missing 2 - I -
Comparison tt 061 .291
Table 13




Whether prior 22.599 .0001
hospitalization
Externalizing disorder 5.481 .0192
Psychotic disorder 12.519 .0004
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V. IMPLICATIONS
Our research has implications in two contexts. First, the ra-
cial data permit observations about bias by both the courts and
clinicians in referring patients to the state-operated Hospital.
Second, a comparison of the clinically- and court-referred pa-
tients within the Hospital permits observations about the psy-
chiatric differences between adolescents who enter the criminal
justice system before entering the Hospital and those referred
by clinicians before they are intercepted by the courts.
A. THE THREE-WAYCOMPARISON:JUDICIAL AND CLINICAL RACIAL
BIAS
Our findings on racial bias inject two new dimensions into
the existing body of empirical research. First, like many others,
we found statistically significant differences in the racial makeup
of the correctional school and court-referred hospital samples.
19
Only 18% of the correctional school sample were White; 58% of
those who the courts referred to the hospital were White. By
considering only the court-referred patients, our observation is
more precise than that offered by all of the previous research
which compared the full correctional school population with
the full psychiatric hospital population.195
We did not, however, find a similar, statistically significant
difference between the court-referred and clinically-referred
samples within the hospital. The clinically-referred were ap-
proximately 50% White, statistically indistinguishable from the
just over 58% White distribution of the correctional school
(Chi-square value of 1.685 and probability of .194).196
Of course, we may have obtained this result because the
courts rely on clinician recommendations in making referrals to
the hospital. The governing statute, however, does not require
clinician input.19 7 Moreover, many courts, especially those lo-
cated outside of Connecticut's three largest cities, typically do
'See supra Part I.B.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 125-65 for a discussion of this prior research.
'ee supra, Table 5.
"wCoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-140 (court "may" order mental examination) & § 46b-
143 (order "may" require psychiatric evaluation) (1995).
662 [Vol. 89
THOMAS et aL6
not consult mental health professionals in deciding whether to
refer ajuvenile for a mental health evaluation.'"
The bias that results in fewer juveniles of racial minorities
receiving treatment in the mental health system goes beyond
the courts and may be much broader than other research has
suggested. Our data suggest that the bias is systemic to the ju-
venile mental health system. Both points of referral to the state
child and adolescent psychiatric hospital operate to create a
hospital population which contains a smaller representation of
racial minorities than the state juvenile correctional school. At
the very least, our findings suggest that future research should
address whether the bias of the juvenile courts differs from the
bias which clinicians exhibit.
The second dimension that our research introduces
broaches an even broader racial issue. Although courts and cli-
nicians refer a population to the hospital that represents fewer
minorities than the correctional school population, the hospital
population still over-represents racial minorities. On this topic,
our conclusion goes beyond even that of Kaplan and Busner.19
In 1992, comparing correctional school and psychiatric
hospital populations with the general population of New York
State, they found minorities over-represented in the correc-
tional system but found no bias in the mental health system.m
Our findings are contrary. The 1990 Connecticut census
reports a state population which is 87% White.2 1 The hospital
population, whether court- or clinically-referred is less than 50%
White. Minorities are over represented in the mental health sys-
tem as well as the juvenile justice system.
At first glance, this finding may suggest inconsistent disposi-
tions by the courts and clinicians. The courts appear to dis-
criminate in favor of Whites by selecting a disproportionate
'" Statement of social worker for the Connecticut Department of Children and
Families, made at March, 1997 grand rounds presentation at the Yale Child Study
Center.
" See Kaplan & Busner, suPra note 7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-163 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kaplan and
Busner's findings.
"'U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 C_.rsus (visited Mar. 10, 1999)
http://venus.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/910827678>.
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number from a mostly Non-white population. Clinicians, on the
other hand, select a disproportionately Non-white contingent
from a mostly White population.
A consistent, but perhaps more troubling explanation may
apply. Both actors may have acted consistently by assigning the
least restrictive available setting to White subjects. In the juve-
nile justice system, White subjects receive a disproportionate
number of the less restrictive hospital slots. In the general pub-
lic, Whites also are more likely to receive the less restrictive slot:
outpatient therapy or inpatient therapy at private hospitals. In
both cases, the Nonwhites suffer an adverse result.
Our findings are subject to two qualifications. First, our
data are incomplete. To ascertain whether any disparate impact
exists, we would need to identify the disposition of all of Con-
necticut's adolescents who are diagnosed with a psychiatric
condition. Without knowing the racial composition of those
who receive outpatient therapy, residential treatment, and inpa-
tient treatment in all possible therapeutic settings, we cannot
definitively determine whether clinicians discriminate against
those they refer to the hospital. But, at least we have raised this
issue for future researchers.
Second, our findings are confined to the institution we stud-
ied-Connecticut's lone state-operated child and adolescent
psychiatric hospital. Because that hospital features a population
which abounds with Medicaid patients, 0 2 our results may speak
to socioeconomic status as much as to race. Indeed, this points
out a significant limitation in our research. Because neither the
hospital nor the correctional school maintained data on the so-
cioeconomic status of their populations, we could not measure
the effect of that status on court or clinical referral. Whether
racially or socioeconomically based, however, the import of our
study is clear. Although court and clinical decision mirror one
another on demographic measures, both send a population to
the state psychiatric hospital that differs starkly from the Con-
necticut general population.




B. CLINICALLY- AND COURT-REFERRED
1. Family and Patient Profiles
Like our measure of racial composition, our measures of pa-
tient and family history revealed indistinguishable correctional
school and hospital populations, which resemble Connecticut's
general population. For example, over 35% of both the court-
referred and clinically-referred reported substance use (62% of
the court-referred reported use) and over 25% received a sub-
stance abuse disorder diagnosis. Yet, in 1995, 10.9% of the na-
tion's adolescents between the ages of twelve and seventeen
reported using drugs.~ Slightly over 21% reported use of alco-
hol.2° And that 50% of all mothers and 75% of all fathers and
other family members had a history of substance abuse is at least
equally distressing.2
Both the court-referred and clinically-referred samples also
exhibited an alarming incidence of family incarceration and ar-
rest history. In both samples, nearly 22% of the mothers and
40% of the fathers had been arrested or incarcerated.2 Yet, na-
tional arrest statistics indicate that less than 6% of the popula-
tion was arrested in 1995.Y7 Although the subjects' reports may
represent an accumulation of arrests over several years, in dra-
matic fashion the numbers still appear to differentiate both the
court-referred and clinically-referred populations from the gen-
eral public.
Some characteristics of the subjects' histories may not dis-
tinguish them from the general public, but may still be cause for
concern. The study revealed that approximately 50% of all
mothers, 25% of all fathers, and 75% of other family members
"3 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 1996
National Household Survey on DrugAbuse: an annual survey conducted by SAMHSA (visited
Mar. 31, 1999) <http://www.samsha.gov/oas/nhsda/hitemp/96hsfinl.htm#eloel. >
' Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, (Press Release, on file with the Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology).
2Uid.
2 See supra, Table 7.
'7 Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, (Press Release Oct. 13,
1996) (reporting a rate of 5807 arrests per 100,000 population).
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had a history of psychiatric illness.2 Early 1990s data indicate
that 30% of the public had experienced recent mental disorder.
By 1995, one study reported that the prevalence of a mental
disorder sometime in a person's life had risen to 48%.2
Finally, both court-referred and clinically-referred subjects
exhibited an alarming incidence of abuse. More than 50% had
histories of sexual and physical abuse . 10  National studies have
concluded that 4.7% of children are reported to have suffered
some mistreatment.21 Social service workers confirm mistreat-
ment in about a third of those cases, or in 1.5% of children.1 2
2. Diagnostic Similarities and Differences
In most ways, the court-referred and clinically-referred were
statistically indistinguishable. For example, the two samples
were equally impaired on most measures of psychiatric distur-
bance, averaging over three psychiatric diagnoses each.2 1 3 Be-
cause psychiatric diagnoses, especially the externalizing
disorders, in adolescents often are accompanied by multiple di-
agnoses,214 this factor is not notable.
The samples did differ in two basic respects. Prior psychiat-
ric hospitalization is the independent variable that most signifi-
candy differentiated the court-referred from the clinically-
referred patients.21 ' This may indicate such severe psychiatric
disturbance that the patient requires hospital-level care to main-
tain safety. It may also suggest a clinical bias toward hospitaliza-
tion for these patients.
28See supra, Table 8.
David Brown, Between Madnes and Badness: A Reflection on Medicine, Morals and the
Mind of the Criminal wmsH. PosT, Mar. 1, 1998, at Cl.
2' See supra, Table 10.
"' Prevent Child Abuse America, Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Apr., 1998 (visited
April 1, 1999) <http://www.childabuse.org/facts97.html>
212 id
21 See supra, Table 12.
214 See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Newcor & Jeffrey M. Halperin, Comorbidity AmongDisruptive
Behavior Disorders, in CHIL) AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NoRTH AMRICA
227 (Laurence L. Greenhill, ed. 1994) (observing that Comorbidity "is the rule rather
than the exception").
1' See supra, Table 10.
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The court-referred and clinically-referred also differed in
mean age, the lone demographic variable that differentiated the
samples. This undoubtedly reflects the legal status of non-
culpability assigned by statute to young children.
Most significantly, the samples differed in primary diagno-
sis. Not surprisingly, patients with externalizing disorders-
conduct problems-were more likely to be court-referred
patients. These disorders, sometimes equated with
"delinquency,"21 7 are associated with the same demographic "risk
factors"218 that are associated with juvenile arrest and de-
tention. 19
Patients with psychotic disorders were more likely to be
clinically-referred. This result raises the question whether these
adolescents are referred by other public (schools) or private
(families and physicians) actors before the adolescents encoun-
ter criminal justice officials, do not exhibit behaviors that lead
to arrest, or are so manifestly disturbed that criminal justice of-
ficials refer them to the hospital rather than arrest or prosecute
them.
These findings might offer some consolation to Lois Wei-
thorn. To be sure, Professor Weithorn would add the court-
referrals to the rolls of "troublesome" youth diagnosed with a
variety of conduct disorders in the nation's psychiatric hospi-
tals.2" But that they originated and may return to the juvenile
justice system and that those who enter the hospital through
clinical referral are more likely to be diagnosed with a psychotic
disorder, a disorder Weithorn explicitly recognized as an "acute
.. See supra, Table 13 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Vanshdeep Sharma et al., Disruptive Behavior Disorders, Assessment and Dif-
ferential Diagnosis, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CuINICS OF NORTH AMERICA
253, 258 (Laurence L. Greenhill ed., 1994).
2' See, e.g., Jose J. Bauermeister et al., Epidemiology of Disruptive Behavior Disorders in
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMmCA 171, 191 (Laurence L.
Greenhill ed., 1994).
2'9 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations
in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRlM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 166-69 (1991);
Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court Processing:
Inequality, the Underlass, and Social Control; 27 LAw & SOC'YREv. 285, 305 (1993).
", SeeWeithorn, supra note 77, at 785, 789.
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or severe mental illness,"21 might blunt her criticism of the
mental health system.
Of course, that youths presenting conduct disorders are
more likely to end up in the criminal justice system than the
mental health system may raise a host of problems of its own.
C. CONCLUSION.
De guy wid de whiskers what sat up on the high bench, looked over
to the Cop, and de Cop says to him, dis is a very bad kid, and he went
into Smith's barber shop and took two razors, and he admits it yer
honor, and what does de guy do, but hikes me right off to Golden before
I had a chance to say a word.2
Our findings have broad implications for any discourse re-
garding the juvenile criminal justice and mental health systems.
Certainly the Progressives who championed the "best interests
of the adolescent" should not be pleased with findings that indi-
cate that race may be a significant factor in both court and
clinical dispositions. 2 Legal Moralists and other critics of illicit
state assertion of control over adolescents might well wish to
broaden their survey to include the mental health system.224
And, the Constitutionalists who once critiqued the criminal jus-
tice system as procedurally bankrupt might wish to reconvene to
consider the substantive legitimacy of the activities of both the
courts and clinicians.2
Some aspects of our findings may please all of these parties.
That the mental health system is more likely than the criminal
justice system to be populated with adolescents suffering "severe
or acute mental illness" should provide some solace to the crit-
ics, regardless of perspective. The racial findings, on the other
hand, may suggest that, like the 1930s English judge described
in the child's quote that opened this conclusion, both modem-
day juvenile court judges and mental health clinicians may not
"2 Id. at 788-89.
22 see MACDONALD, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting from a trial in the Old Bailey Court
of London in 1933).
See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 81-33, 46 and accompanying text.
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be effectively listening to or attending to the needs of the ado-
lescents which they serve.
670 NEWDMEUSIONS IN MEASURING BIAS [Vol. 89
